Europe, and with it, Luxembourg, is facing an international landscape marked by major challenges. War has been raging on the EU’s doorstep in Ukraine for nearly four years, on a scale unseen in Europe since the Second World War. At the same time, the Middle East has grown increasingly unstable since the terrorist attacks of October 2023, with further escalation following the US-Israeli strike on Iran.
These acute crises coincide with broader, systematic risks such as climate change, cyberattacks, and so-called hybrid threats, all of which shape both public sentiment and policymaking in Luxembourg.
These developments are influencing how people in Luxembourg perceive global risks and the threats facing both the EU and their own country. The Luxsentinel study, conducted by the European Strategy Institute Luxembourg, set out to examine these perceptions. Surveying both experts and members of the public, the study explores where people see the greatest dangers and how confident they feel about Europe’s and Luxembourg’s ability to respond.
RTL spoke to Professor Josip Glaurdić from the University of Luxembourg, co-author of the Luxsentinel study, to discuss the findings and their implications for Luxembourg’s political strategy.
This article, the first in a two-part series, focuses on how the Luxembourg public perceives the international environment, where they see the most pressing security risks for Europe, and which lessons the EU should draw from these views. The second article will address Luxembourg’s own security, and how the country might best position itself within Europe to safeguard its interests.
A key takeaway from the study is that experts and the general public often view security threats very differently. Experts tend to worry most about systemic risks, such as the weakening of international rules and norms, while the public is primarily concerned about immediate dangers that affect daily life, like war and terrorism. The data illustrates this divide: 47% of experts identify the erosion of the rules-based international order as the top threat to European security, compared to just 13% of the public.
By contrast, nearly half (44%) of the public see armed conflict in or near Europe as the main risk, while 40% of experts agree. Terrorism is viewed as a major threat by 28% of the public, but only 6% of experts share this concern.
When the focus shifts to economic security, the gap remains: 41% of experts cite technological dependencies and vulnerabilities regarding third countries as the greatest danger to prosperity; only 21% of the public consider this a top threat.
Regarding Luxembourg specifically, half of the experts consider hybrid threats the main risk, compared to 35% of the public. Meanwhile, 22% of Luxembourgers believe terrorism is the country’s biggest danger, a view shared by just 5% of experts.
For Josip Glaurdić, these differences are unsurprising. Most people, he says, do not systematically analyse security risks, but instead focus on challenges that directly impact their daily lives, such as rising energy prices or the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, which dominate media coverage.
However, he notes, these perspectives are not mutually exclusive. They are simply different ways in which parts of society perceive reality, and in fact, they are closely linked. Immediate threats, such as risks to energy supply, are often caused by the breakdown of the global system of norms we are witnessing.
From a policy perspective, Glaurdić argues, it is essential to communicate the connections between daily challenges and broader systemic risks. Policymakers should make it clear to the public that wars and price shocks are rooted in deeper issues, such as the weakening of international norms, and that tackling everyday problems requires confronting these underlying global threats.
Addressing these challenges, however, will require allies. So who does Luxembourg now consider a friend or a foe? The Luxsentinel study finds that both experts and the public tend to identify the same countries as allies and adversaries, but with different degrees of certainty. Experts express stronger opinions than the general public in both directions.
Delving deeper, Glaurdić points out that within both groups, there is a wide spectrum of opinions about who counts as an ally or adversary. This diversity of views is especially pronounced when it comes to the United States: while many still see the US as an ally, an increasing number, both among citizens and experts, now regard America with suspicion. On average, the US lands somewhere in the middle of the spectrum: neither clear friend nor outright foe.
For Glaurdić, the fundamental message is clear: Europe can no longer rely unconditionally on the US as a security partner. This is widely recognised, especially in the context of a possible Russian attack, conventional or hybrid. Many in Europe are unsure that the United States, particularly under the leadership of Donald Trump, would truly come to the continent’s defence.
As a result, he argues, Europeans see a need to demonstrate determination: for instance, by investing in military equipment. But that is not enough. Europe needs a fundamental rethink of its security policy, including an assessment of who can be relied upon.
At present, Europe remains heavily dependent on the US, especially for intelligence and nuclear deterrence, a dependence he calls irresponsible. Yet, apart from a few leaders such as Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, few politicians are willing to advocate for what is really needed: a military arm for the EU, or at least a fully autonomous European pillar within NATO. For now, he sees too little progress in this direction.
Glaurdić says he understands the desire to preserve the transatlantic partnership, which has benefited both sides in the past. But, he warns that we must accept the reality that for about half of the US political community and public, that partnership is no longer a dominant perception.
Hence, the question arises whether we can really afford to rely on such a coin toss every four years, never knowing whether we will remain secure. Glaurdić remains sceptical that the current European leadership is capable of taking the necessary bold steps.
Turning eastward, Europe cannot ignore the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine. This raises a pressing question: how do leaders persuade citizens of the need for sanctions against Russia, when the public is less likely than experts to consider Russia an enemy, especially as sanctions come at a cost and financial worries are widespread?
According to Glaurdić, the EU’s fundamental mistake was to help Ukraine only enough to avoid defeat, but not enough to secure victory. This policy has led to a drawn-out war of attrition, with neither side able to gain the upper hand.
He believes Europe must change course and recognise that Ukraine not only can, but must win the war. Otherwise, the entire European security architecture would collapse. He stresses that if we signal that it is acceptable to invade another country, kill its citizens and then be rehabilitated without consequence, Europe’s whole security structure will collapse.
That would have dramatic consequences: it would fundamentally change the strategic thinking not just of Ukrainians, but also Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, and everyone living near the front.
Politicians, he adds, have underestimated how much European citizens understand what is needed to win this war. People struggle to accept the current war of attrition; this is not a narrative that can be sold to the public. What could be persuasive, he concludes, is a strategy aimed at Ukrainian victory and a clear promise of stable, long-term peace at Europe’s borders.
