Part II ended with a question: why was an ideology that was not only incompatible with Western values, but more importantly with Muslims themselves, aided by the West?
However, that is only half the story.
By the middle of the twentieth century, Pro-West forces had limited popular appeal across much of the Muslim world due to their association with previous imperial powers. Yet, aided by Western powers, many managed to cling to power through monarchies, military establishments and dictatorships.
While the West was preaching democracy and human values at home, it was increasingly supporting authoritarian governments in the Muslim world.
Today, when we see that much of the Muslim world lacks democratic credentials, we must ask whether the problem lies with Muslims themselves or with the political systems that govern them.
The lack of democracy, therefore, is not necessarily because Muslims lack democratic credentials. It is because the political forces that might win democratic elections are often considered unacceptable to the West.
Iran provides an early example.
In 1953, Mohammad Mossadegh, who had become Prime Minister in 1951 through Iran's parliamentary system, was overthrown in a British- and American-backed coup. As a Nationalist who had nationalised Iran's oil industry, he was unacceptable to Western powers. The Shah, already Iran's monarch, subsequently consolidated power with Western support.
Pakistan experienced a similar fate. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Bhutto had pursued a more independent foreign policy that was unacceptable to the US, while Zia's military regime would subsequently become an important American ally during the Afghan war.
These examples show how governments that emerged through democratic processes could be uprooted when they were not necessarily Pro-West.
Current Pro-West regimes in the Muslim World increasingly rely on authoritarianism to remain in power. They lack mass support due to their association with previous imperialist powers. Hence, to remain in power, they crack down hard on any sort of resentment.
Now, imagine an ordinary teenager growing up in such a country.
They see authoritarianism at home. They see their leaders indulging in luxury and privileges while ordinary people struggle below the poverty line. When genuine resentment is expressed, it is answered with severe crackdowns.
Then they see the West backing these governments. The teenager then draws a straight line between their rulers and Western powers.
At the same time, they see that the only credible opposition left is Islamist, as other forces have been eliminated during the Cold War by the West.
That teenager begins associating themselves with Islamists, not necessarily because they endorse their ideology, but because Islamists have become the only visible opposition.
The whole idea of suppressing opposition to maintain Pro-West alignment is actually playing into the hands of Islamist forces, providing them with the oxygen they need.
And this is not a new phenomenon.
Iran provided an early warning of what was aiding Islamist forces.
The Shah was one of America's most important allies in the region. Yet his increasingly authoritarian rule generated widespread domestic opposition.
When his regime collapsed in 1979, several political forces participated in the revolution. But Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamist movement eventually consolidated power.
Egypt provided another glimpse of the same dilemma.
When Hosni Mubarak's repressive regime was toppled by a popular uprising in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the strongest organised electoral force. Mohamed Morsi won the presidency in 2012 through a competitive election.
Afghanistan provided another example.
The Taliban regime was toppled in 2001 and replaced by a Western-backed political order, eventually led by Ashraf Ghani. The new government, supported by the US and its allies, fought the Taliban for two decades.
But the Taliban grew stronger and eventually returned to power in 2021.
These examples illustrate that the more the West tries to enforce a Pro-West regime, the more it strengthens Islamist forces. The harder the action, the stiffer the reaction. Politics has become physics in this region. The lack of alternatives makes Islamist movements the only credible force around which the masses can rally.
But this trap is not limited to Iran, Afghanistan or Egypt.
Pakistan offers a contemporary warning.
The Pro-West military establishment led by Asim Munir faces an ongoing insurgent threat from the TTP, while Imran Khan, whose movement has demonstrated substantial popular support and advocated a more independent foreign policy, remains imprisoned.
Pakistan's military establishment is cracking down hard on Khan supporters while maintaining close relations with the US. If the military were to lose its grip on power tomorrow, without credible civilian alternatives being allowed to develop, the resulting vacuum could be exploited by Islamist movements, including organisations such as the TTP.
This does not mean that the TTP would necessarily inherit power. It means that suppressing mainstream political alternatives creates opportunities for forces that may be far more hostile to both Muslims and the West.
The colonial era may be over, but it has given way to a post-colonial era in which the obsession with controlling other regions has not entirely disappeared.
The strategy of propping up Pro-West regimes may have worked well in the short term, but in several cases it has ultimately created opportunities for Islamists to take over.
The quagmire created by repeated British and American intervention over the past century cannot be resolved simply by handing over regional responsibilities to the Makkah Pact, I2U2 or expanding the Abraham Accords.
These are mere arrangements by Pro-West regimes to change the balance of power, but they do not necessarily reflect what the masses want.
These arrangements do not resolve people's grievances. They are looking for governments who genuinely address their grievances through investment in public infrastructure, healthcare and education.
Until these governments begin deriving their legitimacy from the masses rather than from Western support, resentment will continue to grow against both their governments and the West, potentially playing into the hands of jihadist movements.
The West must allow natural political leadership to emerge and convince ordinary people that the imperial era belongs to the past, not merely through words but by changing its policies.
The Arab Spring has already provided a warning of what can happen when popular uprisings fail to produce stable political alternatives. The instability that followed some of these uprisings, particularly in Iraq and Syria, created opportunities for ISIS to expand.
Although ISIS has lost its territorial caliphate, the grievances that fuelled the Arab Spring have not necessarily disappeared. If another wave of uprisings emerges without credible political alternatives, the consequences could be far more dangerous.
The West has already made one major mistake by helping Political Islam to emerge and strengthen as an organised force during the Cold War.
It risks making another by continuing to support authoritarian Pro-West establishments while weakening genuine political alternatives. If the mistake is not corrected, the chickens may come home to roost.
About the Author: Waqas M Awan is a Luxembourg-based corporate professional and the author of Power of Sage: An Anti-thesis to Machiavellian Prince. He writes on economics, geopolitics, and power systems at his Substack publication Perspectives (waqasperspective). He has held senior finance roles at Amazon, Kraft Heinz, and KPMG.
