Last weekend, the first of my two conversations on the Western Balkans was released. This discussion examined the danger of leaving six European neighbours indefinitely in the EU’s waiting room. This conversation moved from the reasons for enlargement to the mechanics of making it happen. Billions of euros are being directed towards reforms, infrastructure and economic convergence, but money alone cannot build functioning institutions, settle historical disputes or manufacture political will.
The European Union promised the Western Balkans a European future at Thessaloniki in 2003. Croatia joined in 2013, then enlargement largely stalled. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the strategic calculation. The region is now seen less as a distant policy file and more as a space inside Europe where Russian influence, Chinese investment, disinformation and organised crime can exploit political uncertainty. Albania and Montenegro have emerged as the front-runners, while North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia remain caught in very different political knots.
My guests could hardly have been better placed to examine both sides of the process. Ferit Hoxha, Albania’s Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, has spent more than 35 years in diplomacy. He has represented Albania at the United Nations, twice presided over the UN Security Council, and served as ambassador to the European Union, France and UNESCO. Beside him was Petras Auštrevičius, the European Parliament’s standing rapporteur on EU enlargement and the man who personally negotiated Lithuania’s accession as its chief negotiator from 2001 to 2002.
For Auštrevičius, membership changed Lithuania’s position fundamentally. A candidate country may align its legislation, contribute to European security and accept decisions made in Brussels, yet it still remains outside the room where those decisions are shaped.
“It is like being part of the team and playing for Europe, rather than sitting among the audience and observing.”Petras Auštrevičius
Joining that team is a formidable task. The body of EU law, the acquis communautaire, already ran to around 120,000 pages when Lithuania was negotiating. Accession, Auštrevičius stressed, is far more than a bureaucratic exercise in changing national laws. Governments must explain the process, secure public confidence, involve businesses and social partners, and prepare institutions to function within an entirely new system.
The European Union can appear excessively complicated, but common rules also create common standards, consumer protections and access to one of the world’s largest markets. Auštrevičius described the EU as a globally exceptional project, imperfect and often cumbersome, yet still capable of turning former adversaries into partners.
Albania has moved through the revised accession system at remarkable speed. It opened all six negotiating clusters within 13 months and has now passed the interim assessment of the Fundamentals cluster, covering the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security. That allows the country to begin the difficult final phase of closing individual chapters, with the ambition of concluding negotiations by the end of 2027. The European Parliament has praised Albania’s momentum while insisting that progress must remain strictly merit-based and that reforms must be implemented, not simply written into law.
“In the waiting time, we didn’t just watch the stars. We worked. We put our teams to work. We prepared.”Ferit Hoxha
The country’s momentum is real, but the remaining work is extensive. Corruption, judicial effectiveness, media freedom, political pressure on journalists and environmental protection all remain under close scrutiny. Albania must show that reforms are durable and that its institutions can enforce the standards they adopt. Environmental rules are particularly demanding because protecting biodiversity, upgrading infrastructure and modernising public administration require time, expertise and considerable investment.
Hoxha accepted that the list is long. “The negotiation is about the gap,” he said: where Albania is now, where it must reach and how the country intends to bridge the distance.
Auštrevičius described two possible models of enlargement. Under the “convoy” approach, every candidate moves at the pace of the slowest. Under the “regatta” principle, each country competes against the same standards and advances according to its own performance.
“To be first is good, but you have to be the best. What is promised must be implemented.” Petras Auštrevičius That distinction matters because the Western Balkans are too often treated as a single political problem. Albania’s progress should not be slowed by another government’s failure to reform. Equally, geopolitical urgency cannot become an excuse to admit countries whose institutions, democratic safeguards or foreign-policy choices remain incompatible with membership.
Hoxha agreed that the process must remain merit-based, but argued that reciprocity is essential to its credibility.
"Merit-based has to work on both ends. We take commitments and do the reforms, but the European Union has to keep its own part of the bargain."
A candidate that fulfils an agreed condition must be allowed to move forward. Otherwise, public trust deteriorates and reformers struggle to explain why difficult changes bring no visible reward. Hoxha’s response is to move before the political opportunity closes.
"Don't lose a moment, don't lose a minute, don't lose an hour. Work, work, work."Ferit Hoxha
One answer may be gradual integration, giving reforming countries access to parts of the European system before full membership. This could include the single market, the SEPA payments area, EU programmes and eventually roaming without additional charges. Such measures make enlargement tangible to citizens who might otherwise wait years for its benefits.
Albania already aligns fully with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, Hoxha said. European sanctions become Albanian sanctions, and European missions become Albanian missions. His question was direct: if Albania accepts and implements those decisions, why should its representatives not attend relevant meetings as observers?
“Everything they discuss becomes ours. So why shouldn’t we be there as observers? We cannot vote, but we can exchange views, learn and prepare.”
This would also allow Albanian civil servants to understand how European decisions are formed before they must help administer them as members. Accession brings access, influence and funding, but also competition, obligations and responsibility. Preparation inside the institutions may ultimately be more effective than preparation from outside them.
The sharpest part of the discussion concerned strategic alignment. Some candidate countries seek EU investment while also cultivating Russian political ties or Chinese involvement in infrastructure, telecommunications and other strategic sectors. Auštrevičius questioned whether a country can claim that Brussels is blocking its progress while its own decisions repeatedly pull it away from European foreign policy.
Hoxha’s answer was unequivocal:
“When you make a choice, as we have made a choice to join the European Union, it is not a menu. We take the full package.”
For Albania, European alignment is the first test applied to foreign-policy decisions. This is increasingly important because enlargement is intended to strengthen the Union. If new members carry the strategic influence of hostile powers into European decision-making, the process could weaken Europe from within.
Auštrevičius compared accession to “a responsible marriage”. A country cannot demand solidarity, market access and financial support while refusing the political responsibilities that accompany them.
Kosovo remains unrecognised by five EU member states: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. Hoxha noted that practical relationships have nevertheless developed. Kosovo now has visa-free travel, its passports are recognised, and the five countries maintain varying degrees of contact. Yet the Serbia-Kosovo normalisation process remains slow despite dozens of agreements.
“We cannot build the future with the eyes of the past.”Ferit Hoxha
The same tension is visible in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement stopped a horrific war and maintained peace, but the structure it created has also contributed to political blockages and competing centres of power. Hoxha argued that peace arrangements designed for an emergency should not automatically be considered permanent constitutional solutions.
Yet Europe cannot simply impose unity upon a divided political system.
“You cannot import a consensus. It has to be grown from within.” Ferit Hoxha The accession of Albania or Montenegro could provide the region with something it has lacked for more than a decade: visible proof that the door remains real. Citizens elsewhere may then exert greater pressure on leaders who use identity, history or institutional paralysis to avoid reform.
Every stage of accession can be delayed by unanimity. Auštrevičius argued for qualified-majority voting on intermediate decisions, reducing the ability of one government to hold an entire country hostage to a bilateral dispute. This would not remove the final consent required for membership, but it could prevent accession from becoming an arena for historical retaliation.
Hoxha went further, saying Albania would be willing to commit in its future accession treaty not to use a veto when it stood alone against every other member state. It was a striking promise from a country still outside the Union: Albania is already considering how to make Europe more functional once it enters.
“Enlargement is our strength, not our weakness. Let us agree politically to do it on time.” Petras Auštrevičius Enlargement has always produced apprehension. Yet each previous expansion increased the Union’s population, market, influence and strategic reach. For Hoxha, Albania’s direction is no longer a question under discussion.
“For us, it is the bloodline. It is crucial. It is the only project. This is our future.”Ferit Hoxha
The question is therefore no longer whether Albania wants Europe. It is whether Europe can reform itself, recognise progress when it occurs and act before another generation concludes that the promise was never meant to be kept.
